DIFFERENCES IN THE TRANSACTION COSTS OF STRATEGIES TO CONTROL AGRICULTURAL CHEMICAL OFFSITE AND UNDERSITE DAMAGES by Easter, K. William
Staff Papers Series
Staff Paper 91-42  September  24,  1991
Differences  in  the Transaction  Costs of Strategies
to Control Agricultural  Chemical  Offsite  and  Undersite  Damages
By
K. William Easter
Professor  of Agricultural and Applied Economics
University of Minnesota
Department  of Agricultural and Applied Economics
University  of Minnesota
Institute of Agriculture, Forestry and  Home Economics
St. Paul, Minnesota  55108Staff Paper 91-42  September 24,  1991
Differences  in the Transaction Costs  of Strategies
to  Control Agricultural Chemical  Offsite  and Undersite  Damages
By
K. William Easter
Professor  of Agricultural and Applied  Economics
University of Minnesota
Paper for the  1991  AERE Workshop  on the Management  of Nonpoint-Source  Pollution,
held June 6 and 7 in Lexington,  Kentucky and hosted by the University of Kentucky
The University  of Minnesota is  committed to the policy that all persons  shall have  equal
access  to  its  programs,  facilities,  and  employment  without  regard  to  race,  religion,  sex,
national  origin, handicap,  age, veteran status,  or sexual  orientation.
Staff  Papers  are  published  by  the  Department  of Agricultural  and  Applied  Economics
without formal review.Differences  in the Transaction Costs  of Strategies to  Control
Agricultural Chemical  Offsite  and Undersite Damages
Table of Contents
I.  Introduction  .....................................................  1
II.  Why do offsite and undersite damages  occur? ...........................  2
A.  Farmer decisions  ..............................  .............  2
B.  Differences  between surface  and ground water  ......................  3
HI.  Benefits  from improved water quality  ..................................  4
IV.  Transaction  costs  - What are they?  ...................................  5
A.  Information  and opportunism  ...........................  .......  6
B.  Asset specificity  .............................................  7
C.  Uncertainty and frequency of transactions  .........................  7
D.  Creditable  commitments  .....................................  8
V.  Policy options  ...................................................  8
A.  Subsidies,  technical assistance  and education  (traditional approaches)  .....  9
B.  Bans on selected  chemicals  ....................................  10
C.  Taxes and permits  ...........................................  13
D.  Land retirement,  restrictions on chemical  use and direct payments  .......  14
E.  Pollution rights and liability  ...................................  15
VI.  Strategies to reduce  agricultural  chemicals in water supplies  .................  18
VII.  Conclusion  ...................................................... 19
VIII.  Tables and figures  ...............................................  21
IX.  References  .....................................................  26Differences  in the Transaction Costs of  Strategies to  Control
Agricultural Chemical  Offsite  and Undersite Damages
K. William Easter*
Pollution of our water  supplies by agricultural  chemicals  has been an area of
growing concern  since the second half of the  1980's when agricultural chemicals were
found in many water  samples from wells and springs  across the United  States.  This was
added to previous information that identified  agricultural  chemicals  as an important
source  of surface water pollution.  However, most efforts to alter agricultural  chemical
use have  not been to prevent water pollution.  Regulatory  efforts have focused  on
preventing the hazardous health  effects of pesticides  during application and  in keeping
pesticide residues out of food.
Identifying  and controlling the major  sources of nonpoint agricultural  chemical
pollution are not easy.  In most cases, farmers  decide what, how much, and  in what
manner agricultural  chemicals and animal waste products will be applied to their lands.
As a result they strongly influence  how much may eventually  reach  surface or ground
water supplies.  Farmers'  decisions are dictated by their own utility maximizing behavior
and government policies and institutional  arrangements  that constrain or enhance their
decision set (Figure  1).  Soil type, topography, vegetation  and climatic events  all
influence  chemical  movements  towards various water sources as will farming practices.
While farmers have little control over climatic events  they can change farming
practices and vegetative cover  to alter the impacts  of climatic  events.  Thus farmers'
decisions and the policies and institutional  arrangements  that influence their decisions
are critical  in controlling  agricultural  chemical pollution from the use of fertilizers and
pesticides.
When evaluating alternative  strategies  and  policy instruments  for controlling
pollution,  economists  have focused on the  efficient use of production resources  and
largely ignored transaction  costs.  They determine what  tax or other  policy instrument
would be  the least distorting in making producers internalize  the externalities  they
create.  However,  the major  costs involved  in reducing water pollution in agriculture  are
likely to be the transaction costs of enacting and implementing alternative  strategies  and
not distortions in production efficiency.
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organize the section on transaction  costs.This paper focuses  on the differences  in transaction  costs of policies  that change
farmers'  decisions  concerning the use of chemicals  and agricultural waste  products
(primarily manure).  The effects of policy  instruments  and institutional  arrangements are
likely to be different  on ground water than on surface  water, suggesting that strategies
for controlling agricultural  chemical pollution must be carefully  designed  to account for
differences  in water sources  as well  as other physical and socioeconomic  differences.
One simple,  nationwide  strategy  is not likely to be the most efficient in terms  of either
production or transaction costs.
Why Undersite and Offsite Damages?
Since  many water sources polluted  in rural areas  are used by farmers,  i.e.,
domestic wells, one may ask why farmers  pollute their own water supply or that of their
neighbors.  There are,  at least, five answers to this question.  One is that farmers  lack
the knowledge  or information concerning  the adverse impacts  that their farming practices
and input uses have  on water  quality or more  specifically,  "their" water  supply.  A second
explanation  is that they are not concerned  about water pollution costs imposed  on their
neighbors  or those living downstream.  This  is the classic  spatial and temporal externality
problem where upstream producers  damage  the water supply of downstream  users, but
not their own.  Third, they may have decided  that the use of chemicals  or disposal of
manure and the resulting increased  income is more important than clean  water.  They
may even be willing to buy bottled water  instead of reducing chemical  or manure
applications.  A fourth reason may involve  imperfect information concerning  the
optimum use  and application of inputs.  For example,  many livestock farmers in
southeastern Minnesota  apply 60 to  100 lbs. more nitrogen,  in the form of manure,  than
is required for optimum crop production because of the lack of information concerning
its nutrient value (Legg,  1991).  The fifth reason is risk and uncertainty concerning
economic  and weather conditions  that will affect crop production.  Applying extra
chemicals  may help reduce  weather related  income losses.  Thus, there is  no one simple
answer to the question,  but a combination of answers including imperfect  information,
externalities,  risk, farmer income requirements  and waste  disposal.
An added reason for water pollution is the lack of clearly specified property rights
concerning water  quality for either surface  water or ground water.  Do consumers  have
the right to clean water, or do producers  have the right  to pollute the water?  If the
water is polluted, who has  to pay to clean it up?  In many cases, farmers are not
prevented from polluting water supplies, and if a clean up is required,  they generally  do
not pay any more than other consumers or taxpayers.  Holding farmers financially liable
for water pollution would  clearly provide  an incentive  to stop water pollution  and help
internalize the externality.
Farmer Decisions
Farmers make long run capital  decisions, such as the type of manure  handling
facility to install  or farming system  to use, that have important  impacts on their chemical
use  and the transaction  costs of changing  chemical  use.  These decisions  will depend  on
a number of uncertainties,  including future  commodity and chemical  prices.  Annual
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farmer will decide  on chemical use rates and timing based on crops  selected, prices,
weather,  manure supplies, labor available, management  capability  and soil conditions.
These  decisions may change  during the  growing season  in response to rainfall  and
temperature  conditions.  A heavy rainfall in areas with  sandy soil may mean last week's
fertilizer  application has been lost and needs  to be replaced.  In contrast,  dry conditions
mean that less nitrogen  is needed  and different pest control practices  may be required.
Management  availability  and risk play an important role in these  short and long
run decisions.  Nitrogen in the U.S. is relatively cheap  and pest control with  herbicides
and insecticides  does not require as intense management  as does mechanical  and
biological pest control.  Furthermore,  price and weather uncertainty along with the
demands of part-time jobs encourage  farmers to err on the side  of high  chemical  use.  A
little extra nitrogen  may increase crop yields in a good rainfall year by  10  to 20 percent.
Also, if farmers do not control weeds  early in the  season with  heavy use of herbicides,
wet weather may prevent  them from getting  into their fields and applying  the needed
weed  control.  Failure  to control  the weeds can result in as much as a 25 percent
reduction in crop yields.
Differences  between Surface  and Ground Water
Externalities  appear  to be the most important explanation  of surface water
pollution since much of the damage occurs  offsite  or downstream.  This explanation  does
not hold in all cases since  local fish  kills and lake pollution may directly impact the
farmers that cause  the pollution.  Still, a major reason for surface  water pollution is the
external  nature of the costs imposed by the pollution, while lack of information and
income requirements  are more important for ground water.  Many  externalities
associated with ground water are  localized while for surface  water, they may occur in the
next county or state.
The transaction costs of monitoring and enforcement would be quite different for
surface and ground water.  For surface water the problem is its mobility and the
numerous sources  of agricultural  nonpoint pollution.  Whose pesticides  caused the  fish
kill?  While it may  be difficult to identify the polluters of surface water, the most likely
suspects  are upstream farmers.  Yet the mobility of surface water means  that transaction
costs of ex-post  measure of contamination  are likely to be high (frequent monitoring).
For ground water pollution,  monitoring  and enforcement  are also likely to be  expensive
because  of the cost of monitoring sites.  In many cases  the monitoring  of existing wells is
not enough and special monitoring wells  are necessary  to locate contamination  and
polluters  so that ground water quality standards can be enforced.1
Pesticide pollution  of ground water  and surface water  appears to be highly related  to improper use, storage  or
disposal of pesticides or extreme rainfall events  following  pesticide applications, with the exception of a few herbicides
such  as Atrazine.  With  extreme  rainfall  events,  pesticide  movement  is generally  accompanied  by high  levels  of  soil
erosion, but  not  always.  Ground  water  pollution appears  to occur  with  normal  application  of nitrates  and Atrazine,
particularly on lighter  soils.  In the case of surface water, nitrate and Atrazine pollution  is more  closely related to high
rainfall events.
3Another important  difference between surface  and ground water pollution  has to
do with the values  of water uses precluded  by chemical pollution.  There  are, at least,
two aspects to this difference.  One is  that surface water has  a wider array of uses then
does ground water.  Irrigation, industrial,  commercial  and domestic water consumption
are the main uses  of ground water while  surface water can also provide  a long list of
recreational  opportunities.  The second  aspect is that the duration of pollution may be
quite  different between  surface  and ground water, particularly  if the surface water is  a
stream or  river.  Many of the agricultural chemicals  that contaminate  water supplies  are
not as long lasting in the surface  water as  they are  in the ground water.  How these two
aspects will influence  the value of lost water uses will vary by location  and water use.
For example, when the ground water is, or might be, used for domestic consumption and
no good alternative  sources  of water are available,  the losses from pollution will be  quite
high.  In contrast, if the ground  water is used for irrigation and  is not likely to be
demanded for other uses, then the pollution losses are likely to be relatively small.
Benefits from Improved Water  Ouality
With both the amount  of agricultural  chemicals  entering  the water supplies  and
the demand  for higher water quality increasing, the benefits from improving  water
quality are on the rise.  The increased  demand  is due, in part, to the growth in U.S.
incomes  and population,  as well  as greater knowledge  concerning  the harmful nature  of
certain agricultural  chemicals.  The growth  in demand  for bottled water and water based
recreation are both directly related to this  increased  demand for higher water  quality.
Of course, water for household  uses requires a different level of water quality than does
water for recreational  uses.  Yet agricultural  chemicals  have  damaged water for both of
these uses.
Recreational benefits are  among the largest,  if not the largest,  class of potential
benefits from surface  water pollution control  (Rogers,  et. al.,  1990).  Currently,  they
exceed the health or other water treatment benefits from reduced surface water
pollution.  In contrast, the primary concern in ground water appears  to be the potential
health  effects or the increased  cost of water treatment.  In  a number  of cases, chemical
pollution of ground water  has forced the  closing of wells and caused shifts to alternative
water sources.
On the supply side of pollution, there are certain geographic  areas that are more
susceptible  to water pollution and, therefore, they offer higher returns from pollution
control  efforts.  For ground water, these are  likely to be areas with  light soils and
shallow aquifers, or karst aquifers.  The susceptible areas are not as easy to identify for
surface water.  However,  surface water sources surrounded  by moderately or steeply
sloping, intensively farmed lands  are clearly susceptible to agricultural chemical
pollution.  Thus, the physical  characteristics  of land,  climatic conditions,  amounts  and
types of chemicals,  and farming practices will all be important  in determining the degree
of chemical contamination  and level of benefits from pollution control.
On the  demand side  of pollution abatement,  growth  in per capita  income and in
population,  the availability  of alternative  water supplies and the cost of pollution cleanup
4will all be important.  These factors help  determine the value  of protecting  water quality
for a range of water uses.  Clearly, areas with  large populations  and low rainfall, such as
Los Angeles, will have a high  demand for good quality water and programs  that prevent
agricultural water pollution.  However,  given where  Los Angeles must  obtain much  of its
water  supply, it has  a very limited  capacity to influence what  agricultural chemicals  get
into "their" water  supply.  For example, water  taken from the Colorado River to supply
L.A. will contain  agricultural chemicals  that have  come from farms  as far away  as
Colorado  and Wyoming.  Thus the demand  for public action or changes  in property
rights concerning water pollution from agricultural  chemicals  is growing in urban
American  and is likely to continue to expand.  In addition,  because of water's  mobility
the demand  for clean water may come  from areas  outside the source  of supply as is the
case  for L.A.
The cost of cleaning  up polluted  ground water  is sufficiently  high, in a number of
aquifers, to preclude  it as an efficient  alternative.  In contrast,  we have been cleaning  up
polluted rivers for many years at a wide  range  of costs.  The persistence  and toxicity of
the pollutants are both important  in determining  the cost of clean up.  Finally,  the
benefits  from preventing water pollution will be closely related  to the cost of substitute
water supplies  and the intended  uses to which they will be devoted.  To illustrate,  if
water is used for irrigation, there will be little or no loss from nitrate contamination, but
the losses could be substantial if the use shifts to human consumption.  The demand  for
"cleaner" water will also  depend  on whether  the pollutant causes cancer  or just tastes bad
during a few weeks in the spring.  When the demand  is for domestic water use and the
clean up costs are high, with  no good substitute supplies available, then the benefits from
protecting the water source from  agriculture  pollution will be high, especially  if the water
source is susceptible  to contamination.
Pollution control  policies need to be directed  at those areas and types  of water
uses where the highest net benefits to society can be achieved  from protecting the water
supplies.  In addition, policies, programs  and institutional arrangements  need to be
designed so that the cost  of such protection is minimized.  One  of the critical  costs that
should be minimized  is the transaction costs of alternative  courses of action.  These costs
must be compared with  the potential benefits to be achieved  since different water
sources and types  of agricultural  chemical  pollution will have different control  costs.  For
example, inducing farmers to reduce  their excessive use  of nitrogen is likely  to be less
costly than having them change  weed control practices,  i.e., reduce  the use of herbicides.
Transaction Costs
When designing policies, programs  and policy instruments  to reduce the level of
water pollution by agricultural  chemicals,  a clear understanding  is required  of the
transaction costs involved  in implementing each alternative  including search and
information costs, bargaining and decision making costs, and monitoring  and
enforcement costs, as well as any litigation  costs (Williamson,  1985).  The distribution of
costs and benefits involved with each alternative  approach will determine, to a large extent,
their political support  and the level  of transaction  costs.  Ways to reduce such  transaction
costs need to be explored  across alternative  control policies  and policy  instruments.
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defines as something that "occurs when  ...  one stage  of activity  terminates  and another
begins."  In the case  of water  pollution, transactions  occur whenever water is treated, or
has wastes dumped in it, or when new agricultural  policies  or institutional  arrangements
are developed.  Transactions  also include  changes  in farming  enterprises  or farming
practices.  The farm plan that SCS  develops  for farmers is  a transaction that involves a
contract with farmers  that  is difficult to enforce  and costly to develop.
The transaction costs of principal  concern  in developing alternative policies,
institutional  arrangements,  and policy instruments  for reducing water pollution in
agriculture  include,  1) the  costs  of enacting policies and programs,  and 2)  the costs  of
their implementation  with specific policy instruments  and institutional  arrangements.
The latter involves  governance  costs (monitoring  and enforcement  costs and
administrative  and information  costs) and must consider compliance  costs imposed on
farmers and the  chemical  industry.  There will be a feedback between  the compliance
costs imposed  on farmers and  the chemical  industry and the transaction  costs of enacting
policies and programs.  For example,  the transaction  cost of promulgating  improved
water  quality (through  less use of agricultural  chemicals)  as a specific objective  in the
farm bill is likely to be high.  Farm groups and  the chemical  industry strongly  oppose  the
idea because of their expected loss in income.  In contrast, it will probably be more
difficult to build continued  support among environmental  groups to offset these increases
in transaction  costs because  their gains are  smaller per individual and less  clear cut.
However, environmental  groups  have used ideology as a means to  reduce  the transaction
costs of organizing  to promote  such restrictions  (Nabli  and Nugent,  1989).
The size of these transaction  costs will  depend  on a number of factors  including:
- asset specificity,  - information  availability  and use,  - opportunism,  - frequency  of
transactions,  - credible  commitments,  - uncertainty,  and  - the  characteristics  of land
and water resources  involved.
Information and Opportunism
The assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism will be particularly
important  since the benefits and costs of water pollution control  will not be uniform
across  the landscape.  "Transaction  cost economics pairs the assumption of bounded
rationality with a self-interest  seeking assumption  that makes  allowance for guile
(opportunism).  Specifically economic  agents are permitted  to disclose information  in a
selective and distorted manner.  Calculated efforts to mislead,  disguise, obfuscate and
confuse are thus admitted."  Transactions  must be organized "to  economize  on bounded
rationality  (limits on information and ability to process it) while simultaneously
safeguarding  transactions  against the hazards of opportunism"  (Williamson,  1989, p.  12-
13).2  Clearly,  changes  in the  availability  of information,  the way it is presented and the
ability of farmers and government  agencies to process  it will  affect the transaction  cost.
2 Underline added by author.
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for farmers and/or chemical  dealers not to cooperate.  For example,  what monitoring
and  enforcement  costs of restrictions  on chemical use would be required to assure  that farmers  do not under-report chemical  use?
Asset  Specificity
The differences  in asset specificity  across farm  types mean that the  transaction
costs of responding  to changes  in policies or institutional  arrangements  will be  quite
different  among farms,  e.g. dairy  farms  as compared  to wheat farms.  "Asset specificity
has reference  to  the degree  to which  an asset  can be redeployed  to alternative  uses and
by  alternative  users without sacrifice  of productive value  ... It is asset specificity  in
conjunction  with bounded  rationality,  opportunism  and uncertainty  that poses the
contractional/organizational  strains" (Williamson,  1989,  pp.  13-14).  In the case of water quality,  they will cause  different levels  of strain depending  on which  alternative control
strategy  is implemented  and the  type of water resource.
Uncertainty  and Frequency of Transactions
Along with  asset specificity, Williamson  (1985)  identifies two additional
dimensions which  make transaction  cost economics  important  in addressing problems  of
agricultural water pollution:  1) uncertainty  and 2)  frequency  of transactions.
Uncertainty  is critical in both the  farming operation and in the control of water pollution
because of bounded rationality  and opportunism.  As uncertainty  increases,  more
information must be processed  in making decisions and in implementing decisions  which
adds to the transaction  costs.  In response  to  this uncertainty,  investments  may have to be made  in information  systems or in organizational  changes at the farm or regulatory
agency level  (Galbraith,  1973).
The frequency of transactions is important because of the benefits from
specialized  governance  structures or organizational  arrangements.  "Specialized
governance  structures  are more sensitively  attuned to the  governance  needs of
nonstandard transactions  than are unspecialized  structures,  ceteris paribus.  But
specialized  structures  come  at a great cost, and the question is whether the costs can be justified. ...  The cost of specialized  governance  structures  will be easier to recover for
large  transactions  of a recurring  kind"  (Williamson,  1985,  p.61).  For agricultural
chemical  pollution of water supplies the  key question  is whether or not it is possible to
use existing agencies  like Soil Conservation  Service  (SCS),  Agricultural  Stabilization  and
Conservation  Service  (ASCS)  and the Extension Service to implement the necessary
transactions  to reduce water pollution.  If they cannot  or do not have the will to regulate
pollution,  and EPA or a new specialized  agency  must do the job,  then the transaction
cost of controlling water pollution will be  substantially higher.
Another  important aspect  of governance  structures  or organizational  arrangements
is that they provide  different levels of safeguards,  incentives and adaptability.  These
differences would  occur across policy instruments  and institutional arrangements  since
they require  different  types of governance  structures.  For example,  taxes  on agricultural
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direct government intervention.  Taxes provide monetary  incentives  to reduce chemical
use, but regulations  do not.  Yet well  enforced  regulations  offer better safeguards  against
exceeding  specified  levels of pollution than do taxes,  although  a combination  of taxes and
pollution standards  offer both good  safeguards  and incentives.
Credible Commitments
A final  aspect of transaction  costs that is likely to be important in the control  of
agricultural chemical pollution of water is the idea  of credible  commitments  or assurance
concerning the action of others.  For example, what assurance  or commitment does
society have  that farmers will use pesticides according  to the directions  on the label?
Williamson  (1989)  finds that legal sanctions  are severely  limited and  that credible
commitments  are needed because of these limitations.  For agricultural  chemicals  this
can be important  in, at least, three levels.  First, what  credible commitments  need to be
established for farmers,  that the public sector will implement  an effective  program  to
reduce  agricultural  chemical pollution?  Second,  other sectors of the economy have to
make  credible  commitments to reduce  chemical water pollution so that farmers feel
others are doing their fair share,  i.e., urban residential  and golf course  users of
chemicals.  Third,  credible commitments  have to exist  among farmers  so that they will
abide by the rules and limit chemical use.  If most other farmers  are thought to be
cheating,  why should they follow the  rules?  Finally,  the same  types of credible
commitments  need  to be established  with pesticide and fertilizer  dealers.  This is
particularly  important when they apply chemicals  and/or are used  as the point of
regulation or taxation.
Policy Options
To significantly  reduce the level  of water pollution  by agricultural  chemicals will
require  changes  in the farming  sector.  Figure  1 indicates  many of the important linkages
in the farming  sector,  and shows where government policies  and programs have an
impact  on the agricultural sector.  These many linkages suggest that to significantly
change  chemical  use in agriculture  will require a broad-based  approach,  starting with
trade  and agricultural policies  and working  all the way down to technical  assistance
provided to farmers.
We need  to be concerned  with how  trade and  agricultural policies influence  input
use  in agriculture.  Do they encourage  intensive farming  and the substitution  of
agricultural chemicals  for land and labor?  If so, what  changes  can be made to reduce  or
eliminate  such incentives?  One starting point would be to make reduced  agricultural
chemical  levels  in water  supplies a specific  objective  of agricultural  policy,  and include  it
in all legislation related  to agricultural production.
Another step would be to develop  specific policy instruments  and institutional
arrangements to help achieve  this objective.  An important aspect of selecting  the policy
instruments  or institutional  arrangements  is that they are likely to have different degrees
8of effectiveness  depending on whether they are used to reduce  surface water  or ground
water pollution.  Since  surface water pollution  is much more of an externality  problem
than is ground water pollution, the methods  for improving  surface water  quality should
be focused  on internalizing the externalities.  In contrast,  ground water pollution appears
to be more an information problem where  educational and technical  assistance  programs
should be more  effective.  Furthermore,  there may be some important differences  in the
spatial variability of chemical pollutants  that must be taken into account.  For example,
is Atrazine  contamination  more localized  than that from nitrates?
Some of the alternative  policy instruments  and institutional  arrangements that
should be considered  for managing water  quality include  the following:  (1)  subsidies,
technical  assistance  and education (the traditional approaches),  (2)  bans on chemical  use,
(3) taxes  and user permits,  (4)  land  retirement,  restrictions  on chemical  use and  direct
payments and  (5) pollution rights and liability.  The transaction  costs of these
alternatives  will vary widely because  of the institutional  and organizational  arrangements
that already  exist in the  agricultural  sector.  Differences  in information, uncertainty,  and
asset specificity  across regions  and farm types,  along with the possibility  of opportunistic
behavior by farmers, credible  commitments and the frequency  of transactions,  will all
have  a major affect on the level of transaction  costs.
Subsidies.  Technical Assistance and Education  (traditional approaches)
A review of policy instruments  suggests some wide differences in transaction costs,
particularly  in terms of support from the farming sector.  Cost-sharing  (subsidies),
education and technical assistance,  to encourage  the  adoption of best management
practices, have been the traditional public sector approaches  used in the U.S. to control
soil erosion and to reduce  nonpoint pollution of surface water (Easter and Cotner,  1982).
This is  not an accident.  These approaches  are the most acceptable  to farmers because
they are free to participate  or not and the programs  also reduce the farmer's  costs of
adapting conservation  practices.  The U.S. also  has existing agencies that have experience
in providing conservation and pollution control services,  i.e., SCS, ASCS  and the
Extension Service.  This combination  of existing  agencies, no enforcement  costs, and
farmer support lowers  the transaction  costs of this set of alternatives particularly  in the
case of surface water  (Table  1).  However, the same  set of practices and cost-sharing
arrangements  are not as effective  for protecting  ground water quality as they have been
in reducing soil erosion, although  some would  argue  about their effectiveness  in reducing
soil erosion.
The current  subsidy program for soil conserving practices tries  to reduce pollution
by changing the technology  (practices)  used.  Another more general  type would be a
subsidy for meeting  a set level  of water quality.  Farmers could then meet the standard
with the lowest cost method which may  or may not involve  a change in technology
(practices).  Subsidies based  on meeting  a given standard  would  require  establishing  a
baseline water  quality and a system for monitoring water quality which is usually very
dependent  on rainfall  events.  Both  requirements would  substantially raise the
transaction  cost of reducing  agricultural water pollution.  Again,  this helps  explain why
the traditional approach  is being tried.
9If SCS  continues to have  a major  role in helping to reduce  water pollution,
serious questions  need  to be asked  concerning their basic approach.  For example,  is  a
whole farm plan a cost-effective  way to control  chemical pollution of surface or ground
water?  The dollars spent on developing farm plans might be better spent on developing
new farming practices  and promoting their use.3 Since new approaches  are needed,
training programs  for SCS, ASCS and county extension  service personnel  may be critical
for program effectiveness.  Thus the  transaction  cost of using  the traditional  approaches
may not be as low as  it first appears.
It is likely that best management  practices  and farming systems to reduce
agricultural  water pollution will have to be region specific,  which will raise the cost  of
their development.  Research  will be needed  to determine  the impact  of alternative
farming practices and systems on ground water supplies  under different  resource
conditions.  Currently the lack of such information  limits the  effectiveness  of cost-
sharing, educational  and technical  assistance efforts in the protection of ground water
supplies.
The type of research and education  effort that is needed is being conducted  in the
karst area of southeastern  Minnesota.  Nitrates were identified  as the major  agricultural
chemical polluting the ground water in this porous soil with numerous sinkholes.
Research  conducted  by Legg, et. al.,  (1989)  showed that excessive  applications  of
nitrogen were being applied mostly  by livestock  farmers  that failed to give adequate
credit for manure.  Further research now suggests  that even recommended  rates of
nitrogen fertilizer application  are too high.  The research  also shows  the nitrate  levels in
soil water below the root zone  (five feet)  increases rapidly as nitrogen applications
increase  (Figure 2).  Educational  material showing these relationships  are  now being
used by the Minnesota  Extension Service  to moderate  farmers'  use of nitrogen fertilizer
and manure.
Bans on  Selected Chemicals
The U.S. experience with policy instruments  includes bans on selected chemicals
that have been identified as particularly  damaging, such as DDT.  Chemical bans have
been quite effective,  but it takes time  to lower the transaction costs of this alternative by
building  up political support for enactment  of a specific ban.  We are  now at the point
where  bans on herbicides  are being enacted  because  of herbicide  pollution of ground
water.  Current discussions  about bans are focused on Alachlor  and Atrazine,  both
widely used herbicides  in the U.S.
An important  transaction cost that must be considered when  enacting bans or
imposing chemical  use restrictions  is monitoring and enforcement  costs.  When bans  or
3  "In a dynamic setting where technology can change, there will be transaction costs involved in gaining access
to that technology  and inducing the relevant agents to adapt their routines so as to accommodate  these changes.
Hence, in such a setting the distinction between production and transaction  costs is likely to be blurred."  (Nablo
and Nugent,  1989,  p. 69.)
10restrictions  on chemical use  are  imposed, there is a trade-off between farmer compliance
and the  government's  monitoring and  enforcement costs.  Farmers will tend to exceed
chemical  bans or use restrictions  as  long as their expected gains  from illegal chemical  use
exceed  their expected losses  from government  imposed penalties.  These  expected  losses,
OL, will be directly related  to government monitoring  and enforcement  expenditures  and
the  level of fines imposed  (Figure  3).  The marginal loss  curve,  OL, is constructed  based
on a particular  level of monitoring  and evaluation expenditures.  An increase in
monitoring and enforcement  expenditures  will shift  the farmers'  marginal loss  curve from
using illegal chemicals  to the right  to OL" while  a reduction will shift it to the left  to
OL'.  Farmers will apply illegal chemicals  up to the point the marginal  gains,  GO, equal
the marginal  losses from the expected  government imposed  penalties.  If the farmers'
marginal loss  curve  is OL then they will use  OU chemicals  (the point where the slope of
OL is equal  to the  slope of GO.  The optimum level of monitoring and enforcement  is
OQ at a cost of OI given the pollution  cost curve AFP (the minimum  point on the total
cost  curve AFP and the point where  the marginal  cost of monitoring and  enforcement
equals the  marginal pollution cost).  The pollution cost  curve is constructed  from the
locus  of equilibrium  levels  of chemical use  given by OCDEN which is constructed  from
different  OL curves.
The  curve ART shows the total  cost to society from pollution and its  control.  It is
a combination of monitoring and enforcement  costs and pollution costs.  Thus the higher
the  level of pollution costs, the greater the monitoring  and enforcement  costs that would
be economical  to use.  More  monitoring and enforcement would be justified  if the
pollution cost curve  AFP shifts up and less if it shifts  down.  Improved  monitoring and
enforcement  technology  could also change  the minimum cost  level.  This same
relationship would exist between  monitoring and  enforcement and chemical  sales  if
chemical  and fertilizer  dealers were regulated.  In this  case, both dealers and farmers
would consider the potential gains and losses  from selling and  applying excessive
chemicals.
If an individual  state or nation bans selected  herbicides, what might be the
impacts  on farmers,  the input industry and rural communities?  One  likely possibility is
that the impact of a ban on a few selected herbicides  would be minor, particularly  if
there are  good substitutes  that are less likely to reach the ground water, i.e., they are less
water  soluble or break down more  quickly.  Enforcement would  also be less costly
because  the farmer's gain, GO, would  be less from using the illegal chemical.  The curve
OCDEN  would be lower as would the pollution cost curve  AFP.
In the case of a ban on Atrazine,  the impact on net returns to farmers  and gains
from noncompliance depends  on the weather  conditions for weed control  (Cox and
Easter,  1990).  If the weather  is good for weed control,  substitutes for Atrazine provide
satisfactory  weed control  with only a small decrease  in net returns.  When the weather  is
unfavorable  for weed control,  the decline  in weed  control and resulting drop in yields
can be substantial.  The drop in estimated  farm net returns for southeastern  Minnesota
would  be around  $20 per acre with unfavorable  weather (Table 2).  Thus the impact of
bans  and enforcement  costs will depend on weather conditions  and how much risk
farmers  are  willing to accept  when selecting weed  control methods.
11Bans on Alachlor should have a smaller economic impact on farmers and
probably  involve  lower enforcement  costs than those  for Atrazine,  since  there are  a
number of good substitute  herbicides.  However, when Alachlor was banned  in Canada,
the chemical  firms raised the price of the substitutes  by over  15%, which  significantly
increased  the cost  of weed control.  If both Atrazine  and Alachlor  are banned,  the drop
in net returns would be somewhat greater than for just Atrazine or Alachlor  alone,
because  of limited substitutes.  The loss in net returns  to farmers  would be even higher  if
cropping  system changes  are required to improve weed  control, particularly when
substantial  new capital investments  are required  and existing capital  assets have  few
alternative uses  (high asset specificity and low salvage values).  Farm asset fixity  or
specificity raises  the transaction  costs of making major changes  in farming  systems.  Thus
enforcement  costs for a ban on both Atrazine  and Alachlor could be high, particularly  if
it was  a state or regional ban.
The ban could  also have a differential  impact regionally.  For example,
southeastern  Minnesota  generally has weather  conditions  better suited for a wider range
of herbicides  than does western  Minnesota.  This means that  a ban on selected
herbicides  could  cause a greater increase in weed control  costs for western  Minnesota
then it does for the southeast.  Because  of the  drier conditions  in western  Minnesota,
farmers  might have  to shift mostly to mechanical  weed control.  Thus bans on selected
herbicides  may put certain  regions,  such as western  Minnesota,  at a competitive
disadvantage  and farmers would  have greater incentives  not to comply,  which could  raise
enforcement costs.
Government bans on chemical use may take place  at an even lower level  than a
state.  Just as individual  counties have raised their  standards  for domestic drinking water,
they  could also take direct action to ban farming practices  that contribute  to chemical
water pollution.  A county might ban certain  manure handling practices or the sale or
use of Atrazine.  In conjunction with  such restrictions, the county  could help farmers
install  manure  storage facilities or develop  markets for their excess manure.  Subsidies
for alternative,  less polluting  herbicides might  also be used so  the county's  farmers are
not at a competitive  disadvantage  to other  regions.  Such combined  actions would help
keep the negative financial  impacts for farmers  to a minimum and help reduce  their
opposition and the transactions  cost  of implementing  such environmental  restrictions.
However, with outright herbicide bans, what is  to prevent opportunistic farmers from
taking their business  across the border?  This, of course, will not please local businesses
and will raise the transaction costs of implementing an effective  targeted  ban.  The
opportunistic behavior of farmers and input suppliers  along with  high asset fixity  of
farmers could lead to high transaction costs for a targeted  herbicide ban, particularly  if it
alters farming  systems.
An additional problem arises if the ban is targeted just on areas  susceptible to
water pollution.  The susceptible  areas have to be identified,  which will increase
information  costs and raise difficult questions  concerning what farms  to include in the
targeted  area.  Should everyone with  land over an aquifer  or near  a stream be included,
or should  it be everyone  in the  county or watershed?  Again,  opportunistic behavior  can
be expected  from farmers who do not want to be included in the targeted area.
Combining this with the  information costs  suggests  high transaction  costs.
12A final issue involves  the impact on consumers of reduced agricultural  chemicals.
Likely,  chemical  bans will mean  reduced U.S.  agricultural production  and more food
imports.  For the consumers'  budgets, it would mean higher food  prices.  Since many
agricultural  commodities  have price inelastic  demands, producers will benefit and
consumers  will lose  from higher prices.  However,  not all producers will benefit, and
some will benefit  more than the  others.  This will make the support  for drastic
restrictions on chemicals somewhat  uncertain.  Because  of the uncertainty over who
benefits and who loses, the agricultural sector will, in general,  oppose the change, raising
transaction  costs.  Those urban people with moderate  to high incomes will probably
support restrictions  and will be willing to pay somewhat  higher food prices  for cleaner
water.  With low income  people, the support is less clear cut because  of the likely impact
of higher food prices on their limited incomes.
Taxes and Permits
The U.S. has had limited  experience  in using taxes or permits as a means for
reducing  chemical  use.  In contrast, Europe has had some success  in reducing nitrogen
applications through  the use of taxes.  The problem  is that the  demand for nitrogen
fertilizer  may be highly inelastic below certain  levels,  i.e., 50  to  150 lbs. per acre
depending on the soil type, water availability  and other factors.  A similar  situation may
exist for certain pesticides.  The advantage  of taxes is that they can be  implemented
through fertilizer and pesticide  dealers  and provide  farmers with market incentives  to
reduce chemical use.  This means lower transaction  costs in terms of tax collection as
well  as monitoring  and enforcement costs.  Dealing directly with  each  farmer,  as would
be required with application limits, would greatly increase these costs.
Permits could be used if we knew how  much of a chemical  is safe  to use in a
given area.  Permits could then be sold or allocated  up to the  maximum acceptable  level
of use for an area or region.  One difficulty is that the permitted levels would have  to be
varied  by area, depending on an area's physical characteristics  (i.e.,  soil texture,
vegetation  and slope) and  its location  relative to water sources.  Information  and
monitoring (location  specific)  requirements  would substantially  raise the transaction  costs
of a permit system.  On the  positive  side, tradeable permits would put a value  on the
assimilative  capacity  of agricultural  land, and encourage  farmers  to conserve  it.  They
would  also provide  an incentive to limit the chemicals  used because  they could sell
unused permits to other farmers.  In fact, nonfarmers  concerned  about water  quality
could be allowed to buy up permits and reduce  the quantity of chemicals  applied  in an
area.
With taxes and tradeable  permits farmers may  have less incentives  for
opportunistic behavior  and noncompliance  than they would with  an outright ban since
they could legally  obtain the chemicals  but at a higher price.  This should hold down  the
transaction  cost involved with enforcement  and those related  to fixed assets since there
would  likely be fewer changes  in farming systems than with outright bans.
13Land Retirement.  Restrictions  on Chemical  Use and Direct Payments
The U.S., through  its farm commodity programs, has  made extensive use of land
retirement and direct payments  to reduce  agricultural  production  and support farm
income.  Land retirement  could be used in the  farm program,  since it was  part of a
package which  included  commodity payments  to participating  farmers.  Would  it be
possible  to include  chemical use  restrictions  as a requirement  for participation  in the
farm programs  and what would be the transaction  costs of doing so?  One  major cost
would be to get such a provision included  as part of the  farm bill.  Clearly  there is  a
precedent  for restrictions  on participation  in the farm  programs with the current
requirements  concerning soil conservation and wetlands.  However, promulgating
chemical  restrictions,  as part of the  farm bill,  is only one of the transaction  costs
involved.
The task of implementing  a program to retire land or restrict  chemical use would
probably  fall on either ASCS or EPA.  In terms  of being the  most effective  (highest will
to regulate)  in reducing pollution levels, EPA would be the clear choice.  On the other
hand, ASCS, with the help  of SCS, may be the only agency in a position to implement
the program  since they have a presence  in most U.S.  counties.  The problem is that
implementation would  require close  monitoring  and policing,  particularly in  areas where
farmers apply their own chemicals.  This, along with the idea that they will be more
lenient and  sympathetic to farmers, is why ASCS and SCS might be the first choice.
Where  chemicals  are mostly applied  by contractors,  the control  and monitoring  could be
done  through them and transaction  costs reduced.
The high transaction  costs support the idea that use  standards or direct control  on
the amounts of chemicals  applied would work better in controlling agricultural  chemical
pollution than performance  standards  (Braden and Lovejoy,  1990).  Since  chemical use,
particularly pesticides use,  could be controlled  mostly through  dealers,  the monitoring,
enforcement  and  information costs would be relatively lower.  In contrast, performance
standards would require  monitoring and enforcement  at a more micro level which would
substantially raise transaction costs.  Thus,  based just on transaction  cost considerations,
performance  standards are  not likely to  be a desirable  policy instrument (Table  1).
The level of penalties for not  complying with  chemical  restrictions will  also have
an impact on compliance.  If the penalty is a small  fine, then compliance  is likely  to be
low without intense  monitoring.  The farmer's loss, OL, would be low (Figure 3).  In
contrast, a loss of all farm program benefits because  of the  illegal use of agricultural
chemicals  would likely result in higher compliance  levels,  even without  much  monitoring.
How neighbors  respond to the program may also  be quite important  in determining what
an individual farmer will do.  If your neighbors  support the idea of chemical  restrictions
and abide  by them, then it will likely be more  difficult for you to cheat  (social  or
14community pressures).  There  is also the  fear and possibility that your neighbors will turn
you in if they see you misusing  agricultural  chemicals  or animal waste.4
A land retirement program and/or easements  might be used to protect areas with
highly valued  water supplies.  Programs  such as Minnesota's RIM  have been used to buy
easements for  restoring wildlife  habitats.  Similar programs  could be designed  to protect
valuable  ground  and surface  water supplies.  The  transaction costs could be high for such
a program since the task of determining which water  supplies to protect  could be highly
political.  It will also require  a lot more information concerning  the susceptibility  of
ground water supplies  to chemical  pollution and their potential  future use.
Land retirement  and easements would  also be costly in terms of direct payments
to landowners.  Yet easements would be lower in cost than land retirements  if farmers
could continue  to use the lands as long  as they did not apply herbicides.  Still, someone
would  have to  enforce such restrictions  on herbicide  use which, of course, raises  the
transaction  costs.  In addition, increasing  mechanical weed  control could  increase  soil
erosion and augment  surface water pollution particularly  in steeply sloping areas.
Lovejoy  (1990)  suggests that SCS  and ASCS buy the rights to certain  types  of
erosive  land use practices to control soil erosion in erosion prone areas.  He further
suggests  an innovative method for reducing the  transaction  costs of enforcement, where
the property rights are assigned to some group or organization  interested in protecting
water quality.  Organizations  interested  in protecting the environment  such as the Nature
Conservancy or Izaak Walton League would be given the partial property rights and  if
these contractual  obligations were violated by farmers, the environmental  organization
could take judicial action.  This, however,  is just a transfer of costs and not a reduction
in costs for society since the organizations  would do the enforcement  instead of the
government  and could  cause over protection.
Since the practices  that might be prohibited  for soil erosion would have  a fairly
visible  impact on the landscape, monitoring  should not be costly.  However,  if the same
approach  was tried  for agricultural  chemicals,  more intensive  monitoring would  be
necessary.  For example,  how do you know that a farmer applied  two pounds of Atrazine
per acre on a given field, rather than three or four pounds?  (Two pounds per acre  is the
limit  on Atrazine use in Wisconsin.)
Pollution  Rights  and Liability
Implementing  changes  in property  rights regarding water quality is a much
broader issue than just agricultural  chemicals.  It also  must include point  source water
pollution as well  as water pollution  by soil particles  since rights to clean water  should
4  The  freedom  and  ability  to  organize  and protest  against  unwanted  externalities  is  one way  to prevent
excessive  pollution.  The lack of such freedom  may explain why pollution got so bad in  Eastern Europe.  This
same freedom  and ability to organize locally in many areas of the U.S.  could be used  as a means to reduce  the
transaction  costs of controlling  agricultural  pollution through bans or regulations.
15involve  all sources of contamination.  The idea that the  citizens of the U.S.  have the
right to clean water  has been legislated  in the U.S. clean water act.  The problem is
putting such objectives  into practice.  There are limits on the amounts of pollutants that
point sources are allowed to deposit in lakes,  rivers  and streams, however,  the rights to
"clean" water do not exist de jure.  This  is particularly true in  terms of nonpoint  sources
and a number of point sources.  The transaction  costs of implementing  such a major
change  in water  quality rights  is high, particularly in the short run (Table  1).  In fact,  in
the short run,  it is almost  impossible to implement because of the chemicals  already  in
the  soil or stream beds that will eventually enter our water  supplies without any
additional  discharges or applications  of chemicals.
Transaction  costs are important  for property rights  considerations  at two  levels.
First, there are the transaction  costs involved with establishing  or making major changes
in property rights.  For example, what are the transaction  costs of establishing  the rights
to no  chemical pollution of ground water from nonpoint sources?  My guess is that the
costs would be very high.  At the  second level, the transaction  costs arise from
implementing  the existing  property rights.  These  costs will be high if the judicial system
is not well  developed  and effective.
One means of moving towards a policy of giving the U.S.  citizens the property
right  to clean water would be to change  the liability rules for water pollution.  Polluters
could be  made liable for any damages  or loss in uses caused  by their pollution  of water.
For example, in Connecticut,  liability has been imposed on individuals  (including
farmers)  shown to have contaminated  drinking water sources.  This  shifts enforcement  to
the  court systems and, if strictly enforced,  could produce  some major changes  in farming
behavior.  The major problem  is being able to show or prove a farmer has polluted a
particular water source while  others have not.
The  liability for water pollution could  also be placed on agricultural  chemical
manufacturers  or dealers.  This would  act as a tax on farmers because  the manufacturers
would  have to charge  a high enough price to cover the liability  costs.5 Manufacturer
liability would  work just as well  as farmer liability except where nonpurchased  inputs
(manure)  are used  or where  the methods  and timing of application  by farmers  affect
pollution rates  (Braden  and Lovejoy,  1990, p. 50-53).  Thus, in areas where livestock
production  is important  and/or farmers  apply their own pesticides,  a farmer-based
liability may be necessary.
Thus, an important first step in making such a rule change effective  would be to
collect  adequate  information  so that the polluters  could be identified  and the damages
estimated.  This would  be a major monitoring  cost for some types of pollutants because
of the temporal and spatial nature of their damages.  Another transaction  cost is the
litigation  costs that would be imposed on an already overburdened  court system which is
5 Negligence  is  like  a  regulatory  standard  where  the  firm  has  no incentive  to  do  better  than  the safety
standard.  For the liability  rule, there  is always  some  incentive  to do better  since  this will  further  reduce the
exposure  to liability from pollution.
16not a small  cost.  For example,  Kopp, et. al.,(1990)  point out that as much as  "30 to 70
percent of all current  expenditures  related to Superfund take the form  of legal fees, as
opposed to expenditures  for actual removal  or stabilization  of hazardous  substances at
waste  disposal sites"  (p.  13).  Possibly  court costs  could be reduced  or eliminated  through
bargaining to  obtain out of court settlements which could benefit  all participants.  In fact,
clearly established liabilities  should encourage  bargaining solutions  if only a few parties
are involved.  However,  the threat of court battles will not guarantee  that the negotiated
outcome is economically  efficient  (Porter, 1988.)
An alternative  approach would  be to  take action  at the  county government  level
through county commissions  and land use planning  efforts.  For example,  in Fillmore
County Minnesota,  a farmer with excess  soil erosion can be required  to implement  a soil
erosion control program  approved by  SCS and enforced at the township level.  Similar
restrictions could be used by counties  to protect their water  supplies against  chemical
pollution.  Enforcing restrictions or liabilities at the local  level would reduce  the
transaction costs because  farmers tend to know what their  neighbors are or are  not
doing, which could reduce  information  costs.  These local efforts would  be most effective
where  the pollution affects  a substantial number of county residents  other than the
individual farmer,  i.e., there  is a large negative  externality.  Highly visible  erosion and
pollution such as gully erosion,  muddy streams and murky lakes  are good  targets  for
local action.  People  can see the damages  and are willing to put pressure  on county
commissioners to take action.
Enforcement and monitoring  costs may also be lower because  of the social
closeness  of people in the rural community.  When those  causing the water pollution are
well known in  the community, social pressures, obligations and respect for neighbors will
influence  farming decisions  (Robinson  and Schmid,  1989).  The greater this sense  of
social closeness  the less likely a farmer is,  knowingly,  going  to create a negative  water
pollution externality.6 In fact, social  closeness can be sufficient to maintain negative
production externalities  at social optimal levels.  Such a level would be reached when the
cost to the polluter of reducing  the negative  externality would equal  the increased  utility
received  by the pollutee.  Community education concerning the impacts  of farming  on
water quality could  be an important policy instrument  that would complement  local
attempts  to reduce water pollution.  As Braden  (1990)  suggests "a sense of obligation
may be transferred with the knowledge  that one's  action substantially  affect other
people"  (p. 27).  This sense of obligation will even be stronger with social  closeness.
Difficulties  arise with  county-specific regulations  because  of the fear that they may
put the county's farmers  at a competitive  disadvantage  and also because  chemical water
pollution is not visible  and crosses county and state boundaries.  This is why state  or
6 The lack of social closeness had  a lot to do with the soil erosion restriction imposed in Fillmore County.
An increased number of absentee landowners who employed outside management to run their farms was a major
concern  of Fillmore  County  Officials.  They  felt  that  these  "outsiders"  were  operating  with  very  short  time
horizons  and that excessive  soil erosion was taking place.  Since these people were outsiders,  social pressures
were not effective in inducing them to reduce their erosion externalities.  Thus more  formal means where found
to limit the erosion.
17national standards  and pollution control  efforts that focus  on the watershed  or aquifer
are important.  Such approaches  can internalize many of the externalities  that cross
political boundaries.
Strategy to Reduce Agricultural  Chemicals in Water  Supplies
Because  of past  levels of agricultural  pollution,  implementing an effective  clean
water  policy for agriculture  requires a long run point of view.  It means  cutting back  on
chemical  use in agriculture,  a much  greater use  of alternative  farming practices,  and
reductions  in lawn  chemical use  in cities  and towns.  Farmers will not  cooperate  if they
feel  others are, essentially, free  riding and not making "credible  commitments"  to reduce
their chemical  use  (Williamson,  1985).  In addition, the  effect of such  cutbacks may be
limited at first because  of the chemicals  that already  exist in our soil  and water
resources.  A first step would be technical  assistance  and education,  with demonstrations
concerning what  can be achieved  with fewer chemicals  applied more often, but in smaller
amounts.  Use of fewer  chemicals  in smaller quantities  will require  more labor and
better management  skills to maintain production  levels.  Moderate  sized farms may have
an advantage  over large  or corporate farms because  of the importance  of timing in areas
dependent on rainfall.  Irrigated areas not dependent on rainfall during the crop season
may also  have an advantage  over nonirrigated  areas because control  over water  reduces
the uncertainty involved  in weed  control and fertilizer use.
The real question is what mix of policies and policy instruments  has the best
chance  of reducing  agricultural  chemicals  in our water supplies  over the long run.  The
whole process  of reducing  chemical  use in agriculture would be facilitated if it was  a goal
of U.S. farm policy.  Such a national goal would lower  the transaction  costs of taking
action at the state  and county levels.  As a start, local variation should  be allowed
because of the wide differences  amongst regions in terms of physical  and climatic
conditions, crops  grown and inputs used.  Experimentation  should be allowed, since we
still have a great deal to learn about the effects  of reduced  chemical use and how the
chemicals  can best be kept out of water supplies.  Experimentation  is  also needed with
rule making for monitoring and enforcing agricultural  pollution control.  If rules  are
flexible, innovative ways  can be developed  that reduce transaction costs.
A strategy involving technical  assistance, education and cost-sharing  for best
management practices  is favored  by the existence  of agencies which  provide these
services.  Currently  this strategy is being tried  on a limited  scale for ground water
protection and  should be evaluated  for its cost-effectiveness.  Other alternatives  should
be tested,  including bans, use  permits and easements in sensitive areas.  The education
effort should not be limited just to farmers, but should involve the broader population  so
that they have  a better  understanding of the problem.  This has at least two possible
benefits:  first, an informed population will be more willing  to pay higher food prices
resulting from reduced  chemical use  and second, the nonfarm population can  apply
political and community pressure  on farmers  to limit their chemical uses.
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Although the extent  of agricultural  chemicals  in U.S. water  resources  is still  a
matter of debate, most individuals  would  agree that it is a problem for many areas with
intensive  crop and/or livestock agriculture.  The question is, what can and should be
done about it?  First we should  quickly expand  our research  effort so  that we have  a
better information  and knowledge  base from which to design our strategies for reducing
agricultural  chemical water pollution and reduce  the  transaction costs of implementing
different strategies.  Second, we  need to improve  the information available  to farmers,
and its transmission to farmers, concerning  how "best" to use  agricultural  chemicals  and
animal wastes  while minimizing their negative  impacts  on water supplies.  As part of this,
demonstrations  of different low input agricultural  strategies  should be developed
throughout  the U.S.  Cost-sharing arrangements  should be tried for system changes  that
involve  high  asset fixity and, therefore,  high transaction  costs.  Third,  if education  and
technical  assistance  along with  cost-sharing  are not effective then more  coercive
instruments will have to be used.  For example,  the  liability rule could be changed so
that farmers  are liable for their water pollution  damages.  User permits and taxes should
also be tried.
Finally, a broad  based educational program  is needed for the general public so
that they can make  "better" informed  decisions  concerning water pollution.  For example,
what  chemical  levels pose real risks to  humans?  In addition, why  is it alright to have
different  chemical  levels in the water supply, depending how the water will be used in
the future and the assimilative capacity  of the water resources?  Nitrates in drinking
water can  cause adverse effects  on humans  and livestock, but in irrigation water, it can
increase  crop yields and  lower fertilizer costs.
Transaction  costs play a major role  in determining  the U.S. strategy for  managing
agricultural  chemical use.  This is why the President's Water  Quality Initiative
emphasizes  the traditional  approaches,  such as technical  assistance,  education and cost-
sharing, which are implemented  by existing  agencies.  If these  efforts are not successful,
there will be increased  pressure  to try more coercive control  measures with
correspondingly  higher transaction  costs.  This is when farmer compliance  with
alternative  pollution control instruments  will become critical and  determine  the level  of
monitoring  and enforcement  costs that will be necessary  to achieve  water quality goals.
A noncooperative  farm community could mean that monitoring and enforcement  costs
are prohibitively high.  In addition, a strongly  opposed rural  community could  raise the
transaction  costs so high that passage of any effective  legislation to reduce  agricultural
chemical  use would  be blocked.
As economists,  we need to estimate  the transaction  costs for alternative
approaches  to reduce agricultural water pollution and help design institutional and
organizational  arrangements  that will reduce  transaction  costs.  For example, can
arrangements be designed  that channel community concerns  towards effective  local and
state  based efforts to reduce  agricultural  chemical  pollution of ground water?  Farmer
response  and the transaction costs of reducing chemical use  will not be uniform across
the United States, or even across  an individual  state.  Consequently,  community based
19approaches  might be the most cost  effective approach,  particularly when water pollution
impacts are mostly localized,  i.e. ground water pollution.  However,  when the problem
crosses state or county boundaries, these local  efforts are not likely to be  enough.  In
addition,  when other concerns  such as economic  development  dampen local interests  in
reducing water  pollution, then the federal government  may have to step in to prevent  or
reduce  water pollution.
Of course,  decisions will have to be made before  all the information we would
like is available.  The Canadian ban on Alachlor is an example  of one such  decision.
Hopefully,  the U.S.  can approach  the problems  of reduced  agricultural  chemical  water
pollution in a more systematic  and targeted  fashion.
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21~~~M  cTable 2.  CHANGES  IN NET RETURNS  DUE TO HERBICIDE  BANS
ON SOUTHEASTERN  MINNESOTA FARMS  USING
CONVENTIONAL  TILLAGE  PRACTICES
TYPE OF BAN  &  TYPE  OF WEATHER  THAT OCCURS
DECISION RULE  GOOD  BAD
--------------(per acre)-------------
BAN ATRAZINE
Maximum  Net Returns, Assuming Good  Weather  -$0.51(0%)  -$20.50(10%)
Maximum Net Returns,  Assuming Bad Weather  -$7.73(3%)  -$7.73(4%)
No Herbicide  -$11.62(4%)  -$71.76(35%)
BAN ALACHLOR
Maximum Net Returns,  Assuming Good Weather  -$0.10(0%)  -$20.15(10%)
Maximum Net Returns, Assuming  Bad Weather  -$2.64(1%)  -$2.64(1%)
BAN ATRAZINE  AND
ALACHLOR
Maximum Net Returns,  Assuming Good Weather  -$0.51(0%)  -$20.56(10%)
Maximum  Net Returns,  Assuming Bad Weather  -$9.53(3%)  -$9.53(5%)
Source:  Craig A.  Cox and K.William Easter,  1990.
22Figure 1.  Agriculture Related Water Quality System
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23Figure 2  Relationship  between Yield  and Nitrate-N in soil water at  5' in September  1990.
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24Figure 3  Monitoring and Enforcement Cost of Restriction  on Agricultural  Chemicals Used.
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Source:  Adapted from Nabli and Nugent,  1989, p. 48.
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